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one and in setting out a criteria for determining this issue, the court in
General Electric said:
It appears in the evidence that since 1915, although there is no
specific agreement to this effect, the company has assumed all risks
of fire, flood, obsolescence, and price decline, and carries whatever
insurance is carried on the stocks of lamps in the hands of its
agents, and pays whatever taxes are assessed. This is relevant as a
circumstance to confirm the view that the so-called relation of
agent to the company is the real ones
The court went on to say that:
The question is whether, in view of the arrangements, made by
the company with those who ordinarily and usually would be
merchants buying from the manufacturer and selling to the public,
- such persons are to be treated as agents, or as owners of the
lamps consigned to them under such contracts. If they are to be
regarded really as purchasers, then the restriction as to the prices
at which the sales are to be made is a restraint of trade and a
violation of the Anti-Trust law.
16
Possibly the Union Oil case could have been decided upon the basis of
whether a true agency relationship existed. Mr. Justice Stewart put it
very well in his dissent (of the Union Oil case) saying:
After a trial on the merits it may be determined that the scheme
here involved, although on its face a bona fide lease-and-consignment
agreement, was in actual operation and effect a system of resale
price maintenance. Or the District Court after a trial might find
that despite the formal provisions of the lease-and-consignment
agreement, there actually existed here some coercive arrangement
otherwise violative of the antitrust laws."
Had the present case been decided on the basis of whether a true
agency relationship existed or turned on the word "coercive," the General
Electric case would have remained clear and concise, and the voluminous
consignment agreements, which have been entered into in good faith
and substantiated by forty years of decisions handed down by our courts,
would have remained unaffected. Businessmen would still have a basis
for determining whether they have a right to set prices for articles to
which they presumably hold title. As it now appears, there is no longer
a criteria for determining which agreements will be upheld and which
will be determined to be in violation of our "new" antitrust policy.
Richard B. Hancock
CRIMINAL LAW: FASHION OR FELONY
In the past year, nothing has brought about a greater furor in
women's clothing than topless fashions, notably bathing suits. Advocates
have viewed the style change as a further emancipation of women's
Is 272 U.S., at 483.
16 Ibid.
17 377 U.S. at 31.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
fashions and have compared it with other styles which, when introduced,
were also revolutionary. Critics of the fashion have denounced it as
ridiculous, immoral, or illegal. The ultimate problem is whether a
woman who chooses to wear this type apparel will be criminally liable
for this act.
Indecent exposure was an early common law offense which is still
recognized in a number of jurisdictions! Blackstone stated:
The last offense which I shall mention, more immediately against
religion and morality ... is that of open and notorious lewdness;
... or by some grossly scandalous and public indecency .... I
The earliest case3 dates back to 1663 when Lord Sidley was convicted
for exposing his body before a number of people.
The exposure of the naked body, or its parts, must be shocking to
society's sense of propriety to fall within the common law offense. In
Rex v. Gallard' a woman was charged with indecent exposure for "running
in the common way naked down to the waist." In quashing the indictment
the Court said: "nothing appears immodest or unlawful." The Court
based its decision on community standards of modesty and morality,
clearly indicating that an exposure of a woman's breasts was repugnant
to neither. Other cases' have utilized much the same test as found in
Gallard; the standards of the community regarding modesty and morality.
The Gallard case is the sole authority on an exposure of a woman's
breasts and it indicates that in 1773 a woman could not be convicted for
wearing topless fashions. If a similar mental attitude in society exists
today, there could also be no conviction in jurisdictions which adhere to
this common law rule.
Throughout history there have been periods of time when an expos-
ure of women's breasts was considered highly fashionable and completely
accepted by society. If we are re-entering another such era, and it appears
that we may be, there can be no conviction under the common law for
wearing topless gowns or bathing suits.
Many states have modified the common law by statute.6 Oklahoma7
requires a willful and lewd exposure of the person or his private parts.
In Davison v. State8 the court said: ". . . the gist of the offense is a
willful, intentional, lewd exposure of one's private parts .. -" The prin-
cipal difficulty with this statute is the use of terms of art, such as "lewd"
and "private parts," which are not subject to constant meanings.
1 Delaware, Rhode Island and Vermont are states where the common law
prevails; their statutes being silent on the subject.
24 Blackstone, Commentaries 64*.
3 LeRoy v. Sidley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Reprint 1036, (1663).
4 W. Kelynze* 162, 25 Eng. Reprint 547, (1773).5 State v. Bauguess, 106 Iowa 107, 76 N.W. 508, (1898); People v. Kratz,
230 Mich. 334, 203 N.W. 114, (1925).6 Code of Ala., Trr. 14 § 326(1); CAL. PENAL 311.1; MINN. STAT. § 617.23;
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1140; OHIo REv. CODE 2905.30; 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1021.
These statutes are similar in their requirement of a willful and lewd exposure of the
private parts of the body.
721 OKLA. STAT. § 1021, (1961).
1281 P.2d 196 (Okla. Cr. 1955).91d. at 198. Ex Parte Correa; 36 Cal.App. 512, 172 P. 615 (1918). Lewd
exposure must be alleged and proved as an element of the crime.
19651
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"Lewdness" has been judicially defined to mean anything from
lasciviousness and sexual indulgence to obscenity. The Oklahoma Court
in McKinley v. State" said that the term "lewd,' when used in a statute
to define an offense, usually means "an unlawful indulgence in lust;
eager for sexual indulgence."" Wearing a topless gown or bathing suit
in public may suggest gross exhibitionism, but hardly the sufficient desire
for lust or sexual indulgence required in McKinley.
In Francis v. State2 the question was whether wearing apparel alone
would indicate that the wearer was a lewd person in order to sustain
a conviction for keeping a "disorderly house." The court in requiring
something more to show lewdness said:
The fact that girls were seen in said house wearing at night thin,
low-necked, short dresses certainly is not, in this age in which
such apparel is commonly worn in the highest circles of society,
equivalent to a 'scarlet letter,' and stamps its wearers as persons of
lewd and lascivious characters.3
When lewdness is equated with obscenity further problems arise
as courts have often made the terms dependent on each other. This is
shown in Hearn v. District of Columbia4 where lewdness was required
for a conviction, the term previously being defined as obscene behavior.
The Court ruled that "nudity is not per se 'obscene'.' Although stated
somewhat differently the same result is reached; a woman wearing a
topless fashion cannot be convicted for her apparel alone.
Exposure of "private parts" is the most often used term in defini-
tions and tests of the statutory offense. "Private parts" are normally said
to be the genital areas of the body. There has been some liberality in
the use of the term, 6 but it cannot be said to include breasts. In State v.
Moore,7 the question was whether the defendant had been rightfully
convicted of lewd fondling of private parts where the evidence showed
a fondling of the breasts. The Court held that the reference is to the
genital area, not to the breasts. Even if the exposure could be considered
lewd, it would not encompass the parts of the body required by this
decision.
This interpretation of the statute points to the fact that legislatures
never intended the statute to regulate topless fashions, as they most likely
never even contemplated the fashions. It would be wrong for a court
to apply these statutes to acts which in no way fit within the terms of
the law.
This survey shows that a woman is not criminally liable for wearing
topless fashions in jurisdictions adhering to the common law rule and in
most of the jurisdictions that have modified the common law with
statutes. Legislatures and municipalities may pass laws which could
10 33 Okla. Cr. 434, 244 P. 208, (1926).
1 Id. at 436, 244 P. at 208.1216 Okla. Cr. 543, 185 P. 126, (1919).
13Id. at 548, 185 P. at 128.
14178 A.2d 434, (Munic. Ct. App. D.C., 1962).
' lid. at 437.
16State v. Nash, 83 N.H. 536, 145 At. 262, (1929) included those parts of
the body immediately surrounding the genital area.
17 241 P.2d 455, (Ore. 1952).
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